Through the Looking Glass: Wrongful Death, Remarriage and Australian Law Reform by Carver, Tracey
THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS:  
WRONGFUL DEATH, 
REMARRIAGE AND 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM 
 
 
TRACEY CARVER* 
 
 
 
Nineteenth Century wives were generally financially dependent upon their 
husbands and widows expected to remarry to ensure economic survival. In 
wrongful death actions, a widow’s compensable loss was therefore reduced by 
her prospect of replacing the pecuniary benefit formerly provided by a deceased 
spouse through remarriage. In November 2002, a modern Australian High Court 
in De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338 purported to abolish this “remarriage” 
discount. However not all considerations of “marriageability” have been 
excluded from this form of compensation calculation.  In the context of the 
action’s historic social development and the rationale underpinning the 
remarriage discount, this article considers the recent wrongful death 
jurisprudence and future areas for reform.   
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
At common law, a plaintiff’s death extinguished their action in tort and any person who 
suffered loss as a result of the death could not maintain an action in respect of that 
harm.1  It was therefore impossible for dependant relatives to claim directly against a 
wrongdoer, the financial support lost as a result of the deceased’s death. Nor – due to 
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona2 - could compensation be recovered 
indirectly, via an action brought by the deceased’s estate for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries under the deceased’s will or upon intestacy.3  A legal situation existed 
                                                 
* B Bus (Accy) (Dist) LLB (Hons) QUT, LLM Cantab. Lecturer in Law, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
1  Baker v Bolton (1808) 170 ER 1033; Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603. 
2  A personal right of action dies with the person. 
3  Actions vested in a deceased may now be brought or continued by their estate to enable recovery 
of pecuniary losses suffered by the victim prior to their death.   Some jurisdictions also allow a 
limited recovery of non-pecuniary harm: Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 
(NSW), pt II; Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 66; Survival of Causes of Action Act 1940 (SA); 
Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas), s 27; Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 
29; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 4; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT), pt 2.3; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), pt II.  
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where, from a defendant’s perspective, it was 'cheaper to kill than to maim.'4  This 
position, that one who suffered damage due to a wrong causing another’s death could 
not sue the wrongdoer in respect of that harm, had its origin in the relational harm and 
felony-merger doctrines.5   
 
Under the doctrine of felony-merger, where a tortious causation of death also 
constituted a felony, the civil action was extinguished.  The rule championed public 
interest in the prosecution of criminals above individual rights, and preserved the 
Crown’s entitlement to a felon’s chattels and land, which were forfeited upon 
conviction.  This had the further practical effect that, at least whilst rights of forfeiture 
existed,6 any civil right of action was futile for lack of assets to compensate the 
claimant.  However, the doctrine’s continued use to exclude liability in this context was 
criticised7 as affording no justification after 1872 when Wells v Abrahams8 accepted, as 
long recognised,9 that civil damages claims were not destroyed but merely suspended 
pending felony prosecution.  In addition, the doctrine could not explain where the 
conduct complained of was not in this way criminal, and was therefore considered10 to 
result from the actio personalis maxim’s misapplication to situations where the plaintiff 
(being the deceased’s dependant(s) rather than the deceased represented by their estate) 
was still alive.  In 1916, the House of Lords therefore attempted to justify the common 
law by reference to a doctrine of relational harm. 
 
Relational harm arises where a claimant, as a result of the tortious infliction of injury to 
a third party, suffers damage due to their relationship with that party.  In Admiralty 
Commissioners v S.S. Amerika11 the House of Lords considered that such claims were 
based on rights of service of which the claimant had been deprived.  The rights of 
relationship then predominant12 to which the Court referred were those of 
“servitium,”13 a master’s right to the services of their servant, and “consortium,”14 a 
husband’s right to the support, affection, society and services of his wife.   However, as 
a wife’s or servant’s death extinguished these rights, no resulting claim for their loss 
 
4  JG Fleming, The Law of Torts (LBC Information Services, 9th ed, 1998) 729.  
5  See: Law Commission of Canada, Compensation for Relational Harm (2002) 
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/vanpraagh/chap03.asp> at 14 January 2004 (relational 
harm) and Queensland Law Reform Commission, De Facto Relationships: Claims by surviving de 
facto partners under the Common Law Practice Act 1867 for damages for wrongful death, Report 
No 48 (1994) 8-9; WS Holdsworth, ‘The Origin of the Rule in Baker v Bolton’ (1916) 32 Law 
Quarterly Review 431; Higgins v Butcher (1607) 80 ER 61; Osborn v Gillett (1873) LR 8 Exch 88, 
96 (felony-merger). 
6  The Crown’s entitlement to forfeit existed until 1870: 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23. 
7  Fleming, above n 4. 
8  (1872) LR 7 QB 554.  
9  Perhaps even as early as 1625: Markham v Cobb (1625) Latch, 144. 
10  Holdsworth, above n 5, 434-5. 
11  [1917] AC 38, 44-7, 50 (Lord Parker), 54-6 (Lord Sumner). 
12  Both forms of action have been abolished in England: Administration of Justice Act 1982 (UK), s 
2. Loss of consortium actions have been abolished in some Australian jurisdictions: Law Reform 
(Marital Consortium) Act 1984 (NSW); Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986 (Tas), s 
3; Acts Amendment (Actions for Damages) Act 1986, s 4(1) amending Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 3; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 218.  
13  Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 392. 
14   Toohey v Hollier (1955) 92 CLR 618.  Whilst ameliorated by legislation in Queensland and South 
Australia (Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1968-1989 (Qld), s 3; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 65) at common law, a wife had no similar claim: Best v Samuel Fox [1952] AC 716. 
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could then be upheld and consequentially no claim equivalent to the modern wrongful 
death action was considered able to be maintained.    
 
Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution and advent of railways during the Nineteenth 
Century saw an increase in the number of fatal accidents in England.  With deaths 
arising from the operation of new technology, as apposed to violence and murder, the 
wrongdoer was often wealthy and it was considered unjust that they escape liability for 
loss caused to a deceased’s dependant family members.   Such moral considerations15 
and shifting public perception necessitated the rectification of what had become an 
unacceptable position at common law, and in 1846 English Parliament enacted An Act 
for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents,16 commonly referred to 
as Lord Campbell’s Act.  Section 1 of the Act (now the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (Eng)) 
provides that where a person’s death: 
is caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as would (if 
death had not ensued) have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and 
recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable if 
death had not ensued shall be liable for damages, notwithstanding the death … 
 
Today, legislation founded upon Lord Campbell’s Act and mirroring section 1, exists in 
all Australian jurisdictions17 to provide a cause of action against wrongdoers for the 
benefit of the statutorily defined family of a deceased.  Commonly known as wrongful 
death, fatal accident or compensation to relatives claims, such actions perform a: ‘clear, 
but limited, social purpose.’18  The rights enforced by claimants constitute a new cause 
of action arising by statute and are not an extension of rights vested in the deceased.19  
As such, the legislation aims not to rectify the deceased’s damage, but to compensate 
those who have been deprived of one upon whom they were financially dependent for 
the loss of pecuniary support suffered as a result of the death.20  Consequentially, a 
widow’s prospect of replacing the financial benefit formerly provided by a deceased 
spouse, through remarriage, would serve to reduce her compensable harm.    
 
In November 2002 the Australian High Court in De Sales v Ingrilli (‘De Sales’)21 was 
called to determine what, if any, account should be taken, in assessing damages, of the 
chance of a surviving spouse entering a financially supportive marriage or de facto 
relationship subsequent to the deceased’s death.   Once again the wrongful death 
action’s positioning in relation to changed social conditions required evaluation.22  In 
the context of the action’s historic social development and the rationale underpinning 
the “remarriage” discount, this article discusses how issues pertaining to 
 
15  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on Fatal Accidents, Project No 66 (1978) 
3; Law Commission of Canada, Compensation for Relational Harm (2002) 
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/ vanpraagh/chap04.asp> at 14 January 2004. 
16  9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. 
17  Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), pt 4, div 5; Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (ACT), pt 3.1; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), pt 5; Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 
(NSW); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas); Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic), pt 3. 
18  De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 212 CLR 338, 346 (Gleeson CJ). 
19  Pym v The Great Northern Railway Company (1863) 122 ER 508. 
20  The Vera Cruz (No. 2) (1884) 9 PD 96, 101. 
21  (2002) 212 CLR 338. 
22  Ibid 351, 363, 381, 392-4, 405-6. 
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“marriageability” are treated in this form of compensation calculation.  Recent 
Australian jurisprudence on this issue is considered, together with further areas for 
reform.  
II THE LEGAL MATRIX23 
 
Whilst legislatively undefined, the loss compensated in wrongful death actions is 
traditionally limited to the past and future pecuniary benefit that could reasonably be 
expected from the continuance of the life had death not occurred.24  This includes loss 
of income and household or other services (such as child care, hairdressing and 
teaching), with a monetary value capable of assessment.25  However in practice, the 
damages recoverable are subject to statutory limits,26 and medical and funeral expenses 
may also be claimable.27  The construction of the injury compensated as a pecuniary 
concept is supported by the statutes’ requirement that damages be: apportioned amongst 
claimants according to shares; and proportionate to the injury resulting from the death.28   
 
The financial support and services that the deceased would have provided, for the 
purpose of compensation, can be simplistically quantified as a function of the following 
variables: 
 
S  = f [ ( I x C ) Y ]  
       
 Where 
 
I  = 
 
Annual likely pecuniary benefit of net income and services
provided by the deceased over time from date of death 
 
                                                 
23  Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the jurisdiction’s wrongful death legislation 
specified at above n 17.  
24  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 346-7, 360-1, 371, 382, 401-2; Parker v The Commonwealth 
(1965) 112 CLR 295, 308; Franklin v The South Eastern Railway Company (1858) 3 H & N 211. 
25  Generally assessed at market cost: Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, 256. De Sales v Ingrilli 
(2000) 23 WAR 417 (FC), 420, 432-4 provided allowance for the loss of use of a motor vehicle 
supplied by the deceased’s employer. 
26  See (Vic): Wrongs Act 1958, ss 19A, 19B, 19C; Transport Accident Act 1986, s 93(9); (SA): Civil 
Liability Act 1936, pt 8; (ACT): Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002, pt 7.1; (NSW): Motor Accidents 
Compensation Act 1999, s 125; Civil Liability Act 2002, pt 2; (NT): Personal Injuries (Liabilities 
and Damages) Act 2003, pt 4, s 5; (Qld): Civil Liability Act 2003, s 50, ch 3, pt 3; (Tas): Civil 
Liability Act 2002, pt 7; (WA): Civil Liability Act 2002, s 3, pt 2.   Some claims are abolished 
entirely: Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act 1979 (NT), s 5, pt V; Work Health Act 1986 (NT), 
ss 52, 62-63, 189; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), s 54.  Whilst a 
detailed discussion of this legislation is outside the ambit of this article, the provisions of the 
“wrongs,” “civil liability” and “personal injuries” legislation mentioned above were, in part, 
enacted (and in some instances re-enacted in this form) in response to recommendations made by 
The Review of Negligence – Final Report (September 2002) (‘Ipp Report’).  Commissioned in 
response to the perceived crisis in the insurance industry, the Review considered the ambit of, and 
quantum of damages awarded in, claims for negligently-caused personal injury or death.  In the 
wrongful death context, some of the more relevant of these provisions (depending on jurisdiction) 
limit: (a) damages for lost earnings to three times (4.25 times in Tasmania and two times in the Ipp 
Report) average weekly earnings; and (b) recovery of gratuitous services, and implement 
recommendations 49, 51, 52 and 55 of the Ipp Report. 
27  Section 5(1) (WA); ss 25(4),(5),(6) (ACT); s 24(2a) (SA); s 3(2) (NSW) (funeral only); s 
10(3)(a),(b) (NT); s 10(2) (Tas). 
28  Section 18(1) (Qld); ss 6(2),(4) (WA); ss 25(1),(3) (ACT); ss 24(2),(3) (SA); s 4(1) (NSW); ss 
10(1),(2) (NT); s 5 (Tas); s 17(1) (Vic).  Also: De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 346-7, 359; Blake v 
The Midland Railway Co (1852) 18 QB 93, 109-10. 
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C = Percentage contributed to dependants and not retained for the
deceased’s personal use 
 
 Y =  Number of years for which the benefit would have been 
likely to continue if the deceased had not been killed  
 
 S = Total pecuniary value of support provided 
 
Interest is then awarded on the amount attributable to the period before judgement, and 
future losses discounted to reflect their present value payable as a lump sum.  
Notwithstanding that mental suffering, loss of society and other non-pecuniary losses 
are generally not compensated;29 some jurisdictions do allow recovery of solatium.30  
 
Although only Victorian wrongful death legislation frames the test of eligible claimants 
in terms of “dependency,” 31 the phrase has historically been used to describe the lost 
expected pecuniary benefit resulting from the deceased’s demise.32  However “actual” 
dependency, or domestic economic subordination, is not required. In this way Gleeson 
CJ in De Sales cautioned against using the term as a comprehensive description of the 
basis of claims, stating: 
injury can occur in circumstances in which there is no dependency.  For 
example, it is now common for both parties to a legal or de facto marriage to 
have salaried or income-producing occupations.  Each may expect to obtain 
financial advantage from the other, even where they are both fully able to 
support themselves from their own income, and are therefore not “dependent” in 
any sense.33
 
Whilst the executor or administrator of the deceased’s estate normally brings the action 
on the dependants’ behalf,34 in order to maintain an action one must establish that:     
1.   The defendant wrongfully “caused”35 the death through the commission of a 
tort, crime36 or breach of contract;37 
2.  The deceased (had they not died) could have successfully maintained an action 
against the defendant – requiring, for example, a consideration of: liability;38 
contributory negligence;39 and statutory limitation periods;40 and 
                                                 
29  Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269, 292.  However see Wrongs Act 
1958 (Vic), s 23. 
30  Sections 28, 29, 30 (SA); s 10(3)(c),(f) (NT) (also loss of consortium). 
31  Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 17. 
32  Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 368, 379; Halvorsen Boats Pty Ltd v Robinson (1993) 31 
NSWLR 1, 12. 
33  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 347.  Also Misiani v Welshpool Engineering Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 
263 (unreported, Barker J, 19 December 2003); Allan v The Commonwealth (1980) 24 SASR 581, 
583. 
34  Sections 18(1), 21 (Qld); ss 6(1)(b), 9 (WA); s 28 (ACT); ss 24(1), 27 (SA); ss 4(1), 6B (NSW); ss 
8(2), 13 (NT); ss 5, 8 (Tas); ss 17(1), 18 (Vic). 
35  In the sense described in March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506. 
36  Section 17 (Qld); s 4 (WA); s 24 (ACT); s 23 (SA); s 3(1) (NSW); s 7(1) (NT); s 4 (Tas).  
37  Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603. 
38  Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94. 
39  In De Sales v Ingrilli (2002) 23 WAR 417 (FC), damages were reduced by one third on account of 
the deceased’s own negligence: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors' 
Contribution) Act 1947 (WA), ss 3, 4(2).  Also: Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld), s 10(5); Law Reform 
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3.   Those on whose behalf the action is brought: 
a.  Fall within the list of “relatives” prescribed by statute;41 and 
b.  Suffer, as a result of the death, pecuniary loss caused by the demise of one 
upon whom they were dependent in a familial rather than professional or 
economic sense.42 
As an action can only be maintained upon proof of pecuniary damage, nominal damages 
cannot be awarded. 
 
The legislation’s fundamental function, together with the body of torts law of which it 
forms part, is compensation43 – an attempt, as far as money can, to return a claimant to 
the position they would have been in but for a defendant’s wrongful act.  As such there 
is no warrant for requiring a defendant to provide a claimant with ‘certainty and security 
for life … in replacement of the uncertain and unsure situation in which that plaintiff 
may have been.'44  This is reflected in the statutory requirement that a dependant’s 
damages award be “proportionate,” and calculated on a balance of the financial gains 
and losses consequent upon the death.45  In addition, as damages are awarded lump sum 
and assessed once and for all by the court,46 reassessment or adjustment over time is 
impossible.  Consequentially, the provision of compensation in this area is, by its 
nature, speculative,47 requiring courts to assess a deceased’s capacity to provide for 
dependants had they not been killed.   The degree of uncertainty lies in the wide range 
of possible legitimate opinion about how the future would have unfolded.  For example, 
in relation to loss of future income, the amount of a dependant’s recovery depends upon 
an assessment of matters such as the deceased’s prospective: health; life expectancy; 
duration of working life; future income and possibility of promotion or redundancy; 
personal expenditure; and amount of family contribution. 
 
A Contingencies and Financially Beneficial Re-partnering 
 
Given the difficulty inherent in predicting a dependant’s loss of expectation of a 
deceased’s future economic support and the unfairness in requiring a defendant to 
compensate more than a claimant has lost, courts attempt to ensure, as far as practicable, 
 
(Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability) Act 2001 (SA), s 7(4); Wrongs Act 1954 
(Tas), s 4(4); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 11; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), 
s 5T. 
40  Harding v The Council of the Municipality of Lithgow (1937) 57 CLR 186. 
41  Sections 13, 18 (Qld); ss 6(1)(a),(c), sch 2 (WA); ss 23, 28(2) (ACT); ss 3, 24(1) (SA); ss 4(1), 7 
(NSW); ss 4, 8(2) (NT); ss 3, 5 (Tas); s 17 (Vic). 
42  Sykes v NE Rly [1874-1880] All ER 1892. 
43  De Sales (2002 212 CLR 338, 383, 388-9; Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 386, 393.  
44  Jones v Schiffmann (1971) 124 CLR 303, 306 (Barwick CJ). 
45  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 346-7, 360-1, 371-2, 383; Parker v The Commonwealth (1965) 112 
CLR 295, 308; Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601. 
46  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 388, 402; Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health 
Authority [1980] AC 174, 182-3.  Now subject to the making of consent orders for periodic 
payments (based upon a claimant’s lump sum entitlement according to the ordinary rules of 
damages assessment) under: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ch 3, pt 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), pt 2, div 7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), pt 2, div 4; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and 
Damages) Act 2003 (NT), pt 4, div 6; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), pt VC; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT), s 106; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), pt 5. 
47  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 363-4, 372-5, 388-9.  The speculative nature of the particular 
assessment in De Sales was explicitly recognised by Gleeson CJ at 351. 
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that wrongful death damages awards provide a true reflection of the loss.   This is 
achieved by discounting the amount (identified as “S” above) at common law on 
account of the possible positive and negative48 future events, in balance, that may have 
befallen either the deceased (had they lived) or their dependants.  Called the general 
discount for “contingencies” or “the vicissitudes of life,” it includes factors such as the 
deceased’s premature: death; sickness; unemployment; promotion; and divorce.49 
Although such events may be similarly unlikely or impossible to accurately predict, 
accounting for their occurrence is important to the extent that they affect the amount 
and duration of a claimant’s expected financial dependency.  As the discount is a 
question of fact, its amount varies according to each individual case.50  However owing 
to its prophetic nature, the amount, depending on jurisdiction, has become somewhat 
standardised - being in the order of, two to six percent in Western Australia,51 and 15 
percent in New South Wales,52 Queensland53 and the Australian Capital Territory54 - 
although it may be adjusted up or down according to individual circumstances.  
 
1 Actual or Intended Re-partnering 
 
Contingencies may take one of two forms.55  Where remote or impossible to predict 
with accuracy, vicissitudes are appropriately accounted for within the general discount 
for contingencies.  However where the speculative element of a contingency has, in the 
circumstances of a particular case, been removed such that it is more likely to occur or 
is more susceptible to specific calculation, it may be appropriate to apply a separate 
discount.  Examples of contingencies warranting special consideration include a 
surviving dependant spouse’s: death;56 actual marital conflict indicating a likely failure 
of their prior relationship with the deceased;57 and remarriage.  Consequentially, in 
wrongful death claims arising from the death of a “spouse”58 courts, when assessing the 
damages payable to the surviving spouse, take specific account of any subsequent 
financially beneficial relationship occurring59 or intended60 prior to trial.  Although the 
 
48  Wynn v NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 485; Bresatz v Przibilla (1962) 
108 CLR 541. 
49  Wynn v NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 485, 497; Jones v Schiffman 
(1971) 127 CLR 303, 306.  
50  Kschammer v RN Piper & Sons Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 298 (unreported, Malcolm CJ, 3 
December 2003) [179]. 
51  Kember v Thackrah [2000] WASCA 198 (unreported, Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Murray JJ, 7 
August 2000) [13]; Black v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust [1986] WAR 32, 34-5. However, see 
Kschammer v RW Piper & Sons Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 298 (unreported, Malcolm CJ, 3 
December 2003) [194] discussed at below n 193 and accompanying text. 
52  Wynn v NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 485, 497-8.   
53  Mahoney v Dewinter (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, McPherson J, 
15 March 1993). 
54  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 379. 
55  Ibid 348-9 (Gleeson CJ); PQR Boberg, ‘Deductions From Gross Damages in Actions for Wrongful 
Death’ (1964) 81 South African Law Journal 194, 198-201. 
56  Voller v Dairy Produce Packers Ltd [1962] 3 All ER 938. 
57  McIntosh v Williams [1972] 2 NSWLR 543. 
58  In this article, “spouse” means either marital or de facto spouse, unless indicated otherwise.  In 
addition, depending upon jurisdiction the term, where relevant, encompasses both heterosexual and 
homosexual couples: see below n 89 and accompanying text. 
59  Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105. Both marital and de facto relationships are 
considered: AA Tegel Pty Ltd v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591.   
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Northern Territory precludes such considerations,61 the impact of a claimant’s actual or 
intended “re-partnering” 62 on the assessment of wrongful death damages should be 
considered for the following reasons: 
 
(a) Preference for certainty over speculation  
Whilst damages are traditionally assessed as at the date of the wrong, there is inevitably 
a delay between that date and final judgment.  Therefore, as any evaluation of the 
duration and extent of a claimant’s dependency is highly speculative, if an event occurs 
which serves to crystallise a chance relevant to that calculation into a certainty, the 
assessment should proceed on those facts.63
 
(b)  Compensation as an overarching concept 
Since the damage compensated in wrongful death actions is generally limited to a 
claimant’s pecuniary (not emotional) loss, it would be contrary to the action’s 
compensatory rationale to allow recovery in excess of any loss not recouped by re-
partnering.  Damages would instead be punitive and result in over-compensation by 
allowing recovery for a loss of notional dependency otherwise terminated or reduced.64
 
(c)   Preventing illogical outcomes 
Atiyah has opined that to disregard a widow’s remarriage in the assessment of damages 
in a fatal accidents claim would be as sensible as requiring: ‘a divorced husband to 
maintain his wife after she has remarried, or for the State to pay widows’ pensions after 
remarriage.’65  Whilst Budget Rent-A-Car Systems Pty Ltd v Van der Kemp considered 
it: 
difficult to see how a widow suffers pecuniary loss, as the result of her 
husband’s death, when she receives support from her de facto … [or husband] 
which replaces the support which she received from her deceased husband.  To 
hold that she does seems … quite unreal.66
 
In De Sales the High Court, in obiter, affirmed67 that the assessment of a surviving 
spouse’s damages may take into account evidence of the financial advantage or 
 
60  Dominish v Astill [1979] 2 NSWLR 368,393-4; Mahoney v Dewinter (unreported, Supreme Court 
of Queensland, Court of Appeal, McPherson J, 15 March 1993) (proposal and wearing of 
“unofficial” engagement ring taken into account despite claimant’s psychological barrier to 
remarriage). 
61  Taking into account both actual and prospective de facto or marital relationships is precluded: 
Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10(4)(h) (as amended by Law Reform (Gender, 
Sexuality and De facto Relationships) Act 2003, s 62, sch 1, pt 9).  The position in Victoria and 
Queensland has now been modified by the Wrongs (Remarriage Discount) Act 2004 and the 
Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 respectively: see below n 176-8 and 
accompanying text. 
62  In this article, “re-partnering” means either a marital or a de facto relationship. 
63  Willis v The Commonwealth (1946) 73 CLR 105, 109.  
64  England, Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (Pearson 
Commission), Report, Cmnd 7054 (1978) vol 1, [411]; England, Royal Commission on Personal 
Injury Litigation – Assessment of Damages, Report No 56 (1973) [261]; Law Commission, Claims 
for Wrongful Death, Report No 263 (1999) [4.27]. 
65  P Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and The Law (Butterworths, 6th ed, 1999) 113. 
66  [1984] 3 NSWLR 303, 311 (McHugh JA). 
67  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 367 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 396 (Kirby J), 352, 354-5 (Gleeson 
CJ), 375 (McHugh J), 402-3 (Callinan J). 
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disadvantage associated with their actual re-partnering subsequent to the deceased’s 
death.  In addition, evidence at trial of an intention to re-partner with an identified 
person68 may also be considered.  The Court concluded that this would occur as a 
separate, and depending on the facts, potentially substantial discount, in addition to that 
generally allowed for contingencies.  Recently, the Western Australian District Court in 
Hewitt v Tonkin69 again confirmed that, if there is sufficient evidence, a special discount 
might be made for the probable financial consequences of a current or likely future 
relationship, stating that:    
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it was now clear from De Sales … that 
no special discount should be made for the contingency of remarriage.  However 
the High Court does concede the possibility of cases where, if the evidence is 
there to support the argument, some special discount can be made.70
However, there was insufficient evidence (the onus of proof being on the defendant)71 
to support the formation by that claimant of a committed relationship, with associated 
financial benefit, subsequent to the death of her de facto spouse. 
 
2 Prospective Re-partnering 
 
Prior to De Sales, in all Australian jurisdictions other than the Northern Territory,72 in 
the absence of any actual or intended relationship, case law also provided for the prima 
facie value of a surviving partner’s damages to be discounted by their propensity for 
future financially beneficial re-partnering and thereby obtaining a substitute pecuniary 
benefit to offset their loss.73   Loosely termed the “remarriage discount,” it again took 
the form of a discount in addition to that for the vicissitudes of life, which was often 
substantial and accounted for as either a separate deduction74 or as part of and adding to 
the amount assessed (on balance) as the general discount for contingencies.75
 
Upon confirmation that wrongful death statute did not enable recovery of that for which 
the deceased would have sued had the defendant’s wrong not ended in death, but gave 
the persons prescribed by legislation their own substantive right of action,76 the 
consideration of a claimant’s re-partnering prospects became relevant to the assessment 
of contingencies.77  Arguably such discounting is required as, akin to actual re-
partnering, to preclude consideration of a claimant’s “prospects”: 
promotes and legalises bigamy in the courtroom. … [As a widower would 
therefore potentially, in the future, be] allowed to reap the benefits of the 
 
68  The possibility of a surviving spouse’s future re-partnering with some unidentified person falls 
within the term “prospective re-partnering.” 
69  [2003] WADC 203 (unreported, Fenbury DCJ, 29 September 2003). 
70  Ibid [21] (Fenbury DCJ). 
71  Ibid.  See further at below n 175 and accompanying text as to what amounts to sufficient evidence 
post De Sales. 
72  Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10(4)(h). 
73  Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd [1951] AC 60; Carroll v Purcell (1961) 107 
CLR 73.  
74  Jones v Schiffmann (1971) 124 CLR 303, 306 (Barwick CJ). 
75  Mahoney v Dewinter (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, McPherson J, 
15 March 1993) (55% total discount); Row v Willtrac Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of 
Queensland, Atkinson J, 6 December 1999) (10% total discount). 
76  Pym v The Great Northern Railway Company (1863) 122 ER 508.  
77  Law Reform Committee of South Australia, Relating to the Factor of the Remarriage of a Widow 
in Assessing Damages in Fatal Accidents Under the Wrongs Act, Report No 27 (1972) 3. 
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monetary value of the lives of two wives, one technically alive in terms of her 
replacement value, the other actually alive and rendering the services of a 
wife.78
Therefore, especially in monogamous societies where one cannot legally receive the 
support of two spouses, such preclusion would again result in overcompensation 
inconsistent with the principles upon which courts assess damages in wrongful death 
claims.   
 
In 1961 the Australian High Court in Carroll v Purcell considered that a claimant’s 
propensity to re-partner had: ‘so long been regarded as having some value in the 
assessment of damages in fatal accident cases that it is profitless to debate how far the 
established rule is justified.’79  However in De Sales the Court was again called to 
determine what, if any, account should be taken when assessing damages of the chance 
of a surviving spouse entering a financially supportive marriage or de facto relationship 
subsequent to the deceased's death.  The essence was that societal change necessitated 
the reconsideration of how far such an “established” rule could be justified in a modern 
context.  ‘The caravan [had] moved on.’80   
 
III THE PUSH FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 
 
Judicial decision-making should not only do justice as between the parties to a dispute 
but also, especially where the content of legal doctrine is in issue, seek to balance the 
legal certainty achieved through a strict adherence to precedent against the need to 
maintain the law’s contemporary social relevance.81  As stated by Kirby J in Garcia v 
National Australia Bank Ltd, where the assumptions upon which previous statements of 
the law are based have changed appellate courts have a duty to: 
“restate the law in a form which is principled, reflects the current requirements 
of society and provides as much certainty as possible” …   on a foundation 
which is not susceptible to criticism as an historical anachronism or 
impermissibly discriminatory.82
However whist this statement was affirmed by his Honour in De Sales,83 the divide 
between legislative and permissible judicial function must also be maintained.  
Consequentially, Callinan J was of the opinion that courts should be wary of broad 
submissions about varying social conditions and attitudes, it being: ‘the primary 
responsibility of legislatures to identify change and react by legislating, where 
appropriate, rather than courts,’ especially when such claims are unproved by 
evidence.84  For this reason courts should not lightly undermine settled rules of law, 
 
78  Shields & Giles, ‘Remarriage and the Collateral Source Rule’ (1969) 36 Ins Counsel J 354 in PC 
Kober, ‘The Case of the “Wife After Death:” Reflections on the Admissibility of Evidence of 
Remarriage Under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute’ (1980) 15 New England Law 
Review 227, 233. 
79  (1961) 107 CLR 73, 79 (Dixon CJ, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ). 
80  De Sales v Ingrilli (2001) 22(20) Leg Rep SL3 (Kirby J).  See also De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 
351, 363, 381, 392-4, 405-6. 
81  J Stone, Precedent and Law (Butterworths, 1985) 110-1; A Mason, ‘Future Directions in 
Australian Law’ (1987) 13(3) Monash University Law Review 149, 158. 
82  (1998) 194 CLR 395, 429 (citations omitted). 
83  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 393-5. 
84  Ibid 406.  Drawing upon similar statements made by his Honour in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings 
Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460, 511-3. 
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rather any changes should also 'fit within the body of previously accepted legal 
doctrine.'85  
 
The wrongful death action’s past willingness to judicially or statutorily evolve with 
changing ideas of justice and community expectation is endemic, both in its historic 
development and its acceptance of: 
  Changed social conceptions of harm, such that psychological aspects of a 
dependant's loss, although non-pecuniary, are increasingly compensable;86 
  The formation of subsequent de facto (as well as marital) relationships, when 
considering whether a dependant’s damages should be discounted on account 
of actual or prospective financially beneficial re-partnering;87 and 
  The inclusion of de facto spouses,88 and more recently same sex partners,89 
within the definition of “spouse” used to identify eligible dependant claimants.  
In 1994, the Queensland Moura mine disaster highlighted the need for such 
legislative reform in that State.  Four of the 11 men killed were in de facto 
relationships,90 however their partners were not entitled to seek compensation 
at that time.  Section 5 of the Common Law Practice and Workers’ 
Compensation Amendment Act 1994 (Qld) was subsequently enacted to 
remedy this defect, at least in relation to heterosexual couples. 
 
However the remarriage discount has often been extensively criticised.  In De Sales91 its 
contemporary significance was challenged on the grounds that an assessment of the 
prospect: 
1.  Is speculative and difficult to evaluate; 
2.  Reflects a disparity in approaches by judges; 
3.  Is distasteful and demeaning; 
4.  Has been legislatively abolished in other jurisdictions; and 
5.  Is doctrinally unsound. 
 
Historically the discount range allowed by judges has differed greatly, spanning from 60 
percent in some cases,92 to two percent in others.93  Whist, in some instances, this may 
 
85  Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 115.  
86  Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 23; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 28, 29, 30; Compensation (Fatal 
Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10(3)(c), (f). 
87  AA Tegel Pty Ltd v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591, 614-5, overruling Wild v Eves [1970] 2 
NSWLR 326 (which precluded a consideration of de facto partnering) as being out of touch with 
relationship patterns in contemporary society and discriminatory against those who remarry. 
88  Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), ss 13, 18; Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA), ss 6(1)(a), (c), sch 2; 
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 23, 28(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 3, 24(i); 
Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW), ss 4(i), 7; Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 
(NT),  ss 4, 8(2); Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas), ss 3, 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 17. 
89  Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 (Qld), s 83; Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 
2003 (WA), s 57; Law Reform (Gender, Sexuality and De facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NT), s 
60, sch 1, pt 8; Wrongs (Dependants) Act 1982 (Vic), s 4; Relationships (Consequential 
Amendments) Act 2003 (Tas), sch 1; Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 
(NSW), sch 2.3; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), ss 23, 28(2). 
90  Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 5, 2, 25. 
91  (2002) 212 CLA 338, 376, 401; Transcript of Proceedings, De Sales v Ingrilli (High Court of 
Australia, BL Nugawela, 17 April 2002).  
92  Tilbee v Wakefield (2000) 31 MVR 195. 
93  Cremona v Roads and Traffic Authority [2000] NSWSC 556 (unreported, Dowd J, 20 June 2000). 
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be explained as being the result of differing facts, this justification is not always readily 
apparent.  For example the circumstances of the claimants in Cremona v Roads and 
Traffic Authority94 and De Sales were factually similar.  Like Ms De Sales, at the time 
of trial Ms Cremona was 36 years old and had two similarly aged children (namely 10 
and seven years as compared to Ms De Sales’ children who were 11 and nine). Both 
women were financially independent and had no present intention of re-partnering.  
However in Cremona the court valued the claimant’s re-partnering prospects as 
warranting a two percent discount, whilst in De Sales the Western Australian Supreme 
Court95 applied a 20 percent discount.  In addition, in assessing the discount (if any) 
applicable, courts sometimes accept unconditionally a claimant’s assurance that they 
will never remarry,96 whilst in other cases, a deduction is made despite such claims.  In 
Rodda v Boonjie Pty Ltd,97 notwithstanding evidence of a widow claimant’s disinterest 
in re-partnering, after being assaulted and robbed by a subsequent de facto partner, a 
combined discount for general contingencies and re-partnering prospects was assessed 
in the order of 45 percent.  However in Kuhlewein v Fowke,98 although the widower in 
question had remarried and separated before trial, no deduction for prospective future 
financially beneficial re-partnering was made.   The court instead accepted that the 
claimant’s adamant testimony that he would not re-partner was influenced by the failure 
of his second marriage. 
 
Therefore additionally, whilst on its face exhibiting the formalistic equality of applying 
equally to widows and widowers,99 in practice the remarriage discount has not been 
even handed.100  In considering a claimant’s “marriageability” factors such as 
appearance, education, number of children, job prospects and courtroom demeanour, 
have been regarded as relevant to assessing a woman’s re-partnering potential.  
However, as stated by Kirby J in De Sales, ‘an evaluation of physical attractiveness is 
not normally made in the case of male claimants.’101    Indeed a certain male bias seems 
ingrained in the action’s history.  The relational harm doctrine traditionally used to 
justify the unavailability, prior to legislative intervention, of a dependant’s claim at 
common law – in that it is based upon rights of consortium unavailable to women at law 
and rights of servitium unlikely to have been exercised by women during that period – 
to some extent presupposed that women would never have an entitlement to claim as a 
result of the tortious infliction of another’s death, the denial of which required 
justification.  
 
Further criticism of this method of assessment appears in Buckley v John Allen & Ford 
(Oxford) Ltd where Phillimore J stated: 
[Counsel for the defendant says that the claimant] is an attractive woman … Am 
I to ask her to put on a bathing dress; because the witness box is calculated to 
 
94  Ibid. 
95  (2000) 23 WAR 417 (FC), 436-8 (Miller and Parker JJ; Wallwork J dissenting).  This judgement 
was the subject of the High Court appeal. 
96  McCullagh v Lawrence [1989] 1 Qd R 163. 
97  (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 27 May 1993). 
98  [2000] QSC 404 (unreported, Mullins J, 10 November 2000) [35-9]. 
99  Herman v Johnston [1972] WAR 121, 124. 
100  Although it is uncertain how this may (at least in part) reflect the potential that the majority of 
claims have been brought by women. 
101  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 385. See also Justice R Atkinson, ‘Women and Justice: Is There Justice for 
Women?’ (2003) 3(1) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 75, 80. 
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disguise the figure?  … Is a judge fitted to assess the chance  … or wishes of a 
lady about whom he knows so little and whom he has encountered for twenty 
minutes when she was in the witness box …? Judges should, I think, act on 
evidence rather than guesswork.  It seems to me that this particular exercise is 
not only unattractive but also is not one for which judges are equipped.102
 
In the past, surviving partners have been subject to private investigation103 and intrusive 
cross-examination on behalf of defendants trying to establish involvement in subsequent 
relationships, or deterioration of the former relationship with the deceased, as a means 
of reducing the damages otherwise payable.   In Row v Willtrac Pty Ltd a widow’s 
cross-examination upon expressed dissatisfaction in her marriage caused such great 
distress Atkinson J considered that the claimant was:  
heavily drugged with valium to help her cope …  What she said while under the 
effects of drugs, shock and grief cannot be thought to be a reliable insight into 
the state of her marriage which had so abruptly ended in horrible circumstances 
…104
 
In addition, whilst the Northern Territory,105 England106 and most American States107 
have abolished taking into account both actual and prospective re-partnering (although 
the English position applies in relation to widows only), the High Court in De Sales108 
did not consider this determinative of the position to be taken. 
 
The Supreme Court in De Sales made reference to the claimant’s ‘age and 
credentials’109 in assessing her chance of remarriage.  However the High Court 
confirmed110 that as Ms De Sales was not present during argument and there was no 
reason to believe that the bench had seen her, the “credentials” reference could not be 
taken to refer to the judicial impact of her personality and physical appearance.  
Notwithstanding this the Court concluded that concepts of “marriageability” were 
misleading and should not be used as indicia of a dependant’s prospects of financially 
beneficial re-partnering.111  As such, the case went some way towards challenging the 
assumptions implicit in the assessment of wrongful death damages in order that their 
patriarchal foundation, and consequent application, may be exposed.    Indeed it is here 
that the High Court most advanced the argument of those who view the remarriage 
discount as an outdated tool for assessing compensation. 
 
 
 
 
102  [1967] 2 QB 637, 644-5. 
103  Law Commission, above n 64, 61. 
104  (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Atkinson J, 6 December 1999) [38]. 
105  Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10(4)(h). See further above n 61. 
106  Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (Eng), s 3(3). 
107  Van Knapp (ed), American Jurisprudence (Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 2nd ed, vol 
22A, 1988) para 139, 309, 471-3. 
108  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 376-7, 389, 405. 
109  (2000) 23 WAR 417 (FC), 437. 
110  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 355. 
111  Ibid 354-5 (Gleeson CJ), 365 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  However see Callinan J who 
appears to exhibit a contrary view at 404. 
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IV PROSPECTIVE RE-PARTNERING POST DE SALES 
 
De Sales v Ingrilli involved a claim brought under the Fatal Accidents Act 1959 (WA) 
by Ms De Sales,112 on behalf of herself and her two children, for injury sustained as a 
result of her husband's death in a diving accident caused, in part, by the respondent’s 
negligence.  The High Court decision involved an appeal in relation to the damages 
assessed by the Western Australian Supreme Court, which held that in relation to Ms De 
Sales’ chance of obtaining financial support from remarriage, ‘for a woman of the 
appellant’s age and credentials a 20 percent deduction would be appropriate.’113  This 
increased the discount from five percent awarded at first instance by the District 
Court.114   In addition, and contrary to the decision at first instance, a further five 
percent discount for general contingencies was ordered.  This second deduction, unlike 
the discount for re-partnering prospects, applied to the children as well as Ms De Sales.  
Consequentially, the grounds of appeal before the High Court were that:  
1.  The remarriage discount should be abolished; or 
2.  The Supreme Court erred in increasing the discount from five to 20 percent; or 
3.  The Court should apply guidelines as to the appropriate discount percentage 
having regard to modern day realities. 
The discount for general contingencies was also challenged.115
 
In allowing the appeal a 4:3 majority (Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ) 
concluded that “ordinarily”116 no deduction should be made in wrongful death actions 
for the contingency of a surviving partner remarrying (and by analogy re-partnering), 
‘whether as a separate deduction, or as an item added to the amount otherwise judged to 
be an appropriate deduction for the vicissitudes of life,’117 and that in De Sales no 
discount should have been made.  Rather the chance was, according to Kirby J, ‘merely 
another of the many possible vicissitudes … to be given no more weight than any of the 
other vicissitudes that go to make up the general discount.’118   The Supreme Court’s 
assessment of general contingencies was however affirmed,119 as being within the 
standard range of two to six percent120 normally applied in Western Australia. 
 
The High Court majority in De Sales therefore abolished the previously separate 
discount for the possibility of financially beneficial re-partnering, and instead included 
considerations of prospective re-partnering within the general discount for 
contingencies.121  In doing so the Court repositioned the remarriage discount within the 
accepted two-pronged classification of contingencies discussed previously.122  Rather 
than being viewed as a separate identifiable contingency susceptible to specific 
 
112  That the appellant was not the executor of the deceased’s estate as required by s 6(1)(b), and 
therefore had no standing to bring the proceedings, was not challenged. 
113  De Sales v Ingrilli (2000) 23 WAR 417 (FC), 436-8. 
114  De Sales v Ingrilli [1999] WADC 80 (unreported, Jackson DCJ, 25 October, 1999) [66], [87]. 
115  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 345, 358-9, 368, 370, 381, 400. 
116  See further discussion at below n 146-8 and accompanying text.  
117  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 357, (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 395 (Kirby J). 
118  Ibid 397.  See also 366 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
119  Ibid 369, 396. 
120  Kember v Thackrah [2000] WASCA 198 (unreported, Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Murray JJ, 7 
August 2000) [13]; Black v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust [1986] WAR 32, 34-5. 
121  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 366-7, 369, 397. 
122  See Boberg, above n 55 and accompanying text. 
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calculation, it should be considered together with other forms of contingency and an 
overall discount, taking account of all such possibilities, reached.  Several reasons were 
provided for this conclusion.  Whilst acknowledging that a wide range of financial 
possibilities and future contingencies must be balanced in assessing claims under the 
wrongful death legislation, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ considered that it was 
wrong to treat a dependant claimant’s chance of financially beneficial re-partnering as 
an item warranting separate consideration because: 
Why should one of those possibilities … be considered separately from all 
others?  To consider it separately assumes that it is a contingency whose 
likelihood of occurrence can be separately assessed with reasonable accuracy, 
and that the financial consequences … will … tend in one direction (financial 
advantage) … [However] [e]ven if the prospects that a surviving spouse would 
… enter a new continuing relationship could be assessed … predicting when that 
would occur is impossible … But most importantly, it cannot be assumed that 
any new union will be, or will remain, of financial advantage … That being so, 
some financially advantageous … relationship must be treated as only one of 
many possible paths that the future may hold …  That others in the past have 
had damages reduced on this account is not reason enough to continue the 
error.123
 
Justice Kirby, concurring, paid particular regard to social changes occurring since the 
discount was first required.  These included a growth in:124
  Divorce rates; 
  Incidence of employment and the social and economic independence of women; 
  The availability of social security; 
  Social acceptance of single women; 
  Mobility between economic classes; and 
  The number of judges less likely to base a widow’s remarriage prospects upon 
stereotyped assumptions. 
 
These factors rendered individuals less financially dependant upon domestic 
partnerships, and less certain of re-partnering with a person of similar economic 
capacity to the deceased.  His Honour also considered the remarriage discount to be: 
speculative; distasteful; demeaning; exhibiting disparity in amount; and revealing a 
‘distinctly male perspective.’125   
 
However, whilst the possibility of financially beneficial re-partnering was subsumed 
within general contingencies, it was viewed by the majority as not enlarging the 
discount generally awarded - the prospect cannot:  
be seen as a matter, which under the general heading of “the vicissitudes of life”, 
enlarges the discount which otherwise must be made from the present value of 
the benefits which the deceased was providing at death … The discount can be 
assessed only as a single sum which reflects all of the possibilities.126
 
 
123  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 365-7.  See also 394 (Kirby J). 
124  Ibid 392-3.  See also 363 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
125  Ibid 394. 
126  Ibid 367 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  See also 397 (Kirby J). 
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Chief Justice Gleeson (in the minority) also considered that the possibility of financially 
beneficial re-partnering should “ordinarily” be treated as part of the discount for general 
contingencies and not subject to special or separate consideration, opining that whilst 
there are: 
many uncertainties that attend the contingency of a financially beneficial 
remarriage: when it occurs, whether it will last … and whether it is or continues 
to be financially advantageous … these uncertainties are no greater than many 
that attend the assessment of other “vicissitudes of life.”127
 
However, unlike the majority, his Honour favoured treating the prospect as adding to 
general contingencies by a modest amount stating: 
I have difficulty in understanding how this Court can decide that the possibility 
of beneficial marriage may be taken into account as one of the general 
vicissitudes … and at the same time deny to a trial judge the capacity … to treat 
it as increasing the allowance for vicissitudes that would otherwise be made.128
 
Conversely, influenced by principles of: fairness; once and for all assessment; and the 
compensatory function of damages (meaning that awards, in assessing damages 
proportionate to the injury sustained, are not meant to be punitive),129 Callinan and 
McHugh JJ preferred to maintain the practice of awarding a separate or specific 
discount.130  In addition, as the discount should be made by reference to the actual 
circumstances of the particular case, Callinan J considered the provision of guidelines 
impractical and not to be introduced.131
 
A Interpreting the Decision 
 
Social conditions and assumptions about women and marriage have changed drastically 
since the initial development of the wrongful death action, and incidentally the 
remarriage discount, in the mid 1800's.  Then society was organised such that men were 
educated and earned income whilst women kept house and children.  Until 1870, upon 
marriage a woman's property and income became her husband’s. 132   Therefore, due to 
the prevailing class structure and lack of formal education,133 Nineteenth Century wives 
were generally financially dependent upon their spouse and widows expected to remarry 
to ensure economic survival.  However in modern Australian society: 
Old ideas of [a] wife living in a fixed and settled routine, allowed so many 
pounds a month for the household ... and looking forward to the dowerhouse in 
widowhood or to some other variant secured to her by marriage settlement, have 
been jettisoned by the community … Instead, we are presented with working 
wives displaying independence in action and in matters of finance, households 
run almost as joint enterprises … and, speaking generally, vicissitudes in family 
 
127  Ibid 353. 
128  Ibid 356.  See also 354-5. 
129  Ibid 370, 375-6, 402-4. 
130  Ibid 378-9, 402, 407. 
131  Ibid 407. 
132  Remedied by the enactment of a series of acts between 1870 and 1893 beginning with the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1870 (Eng), which was reflected during this time by similar legislation in 
the Australian Colonies. 
133  M Moore, Women’s Issues Then & Now: A Feminist Overview of the Past 2 Centuries (3 May 
2002) <http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~ulrich/femhist/marriage.shtml> at 22 April 2004. 
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life which, in their frequency and magnitude, can bewilder … those who witness 
them.134
 
Consequentially, as also reflected in Knight v Anderson,135 past assumptions about the 
necessity of a woman’s life-long financial dependency upon a male domestic partner are 
today unsupportable.  Here the Western Australian Supreme Court rejected an argument 
that a claimant’s pregnancy subsequent to her husband’s death falsified testimony that 
she would never re-partner. It could not be shown that pregnancy alone would increase 
the likelihood that she would remarry and thereby obtain a degree of financial support 
to offset the loss claimed in her wrongful death action.  However, whilst one can no 
longer make assumptions, of the magnitude afforded in the past, about the role that an 
individual can be expected to play in family or economy, and this position has been 
used to justify previous reformatory decisions of the High Court,136 in De Sales 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ confirmed that it is such ‘assumptions of conformity 
to some unstated norm which underpin the making of a “discount for remarriage.”’137
 
With the advent of social security, present day dependants are less likely to be destitute 
upon the death of a breadwinner as in earlier times.  Nor are women compelled to marry 
in order to gain financial security or social acceptance. In addition, one cannot 
automatically assume that any person’s future re-partnering will be beneficial.138  Youth 
or conventional “good looks” do not guarantee marriage into enduring or financially 
supportive unions.  A subsequent partner may be an invalid, an alcoholic, or unwilling 
or unable to perform their legal or moral obligation to support.139  That being so, when 
all life’s future ups and downs are balanced, it is appropriate to conclude, similarly to 
the High Court majority in De Sales, that the factors impacting on the assessment and 
prediction of one’s potential for financially beneficial re-partnering are so multifarious, 
that (absent actual or intended re-partnering) the mere prospect does not: 
1.  Automatically deserve to be given separate or substantial weight and affect in 
discounting damages awards; or 
2.  Warrant an increase in the vicissitudes percentage beyond that range already 
generally allowed as a standard.140 
 
The first proposition has been subsequently affirmed by the New South Wales Supreme 
Court in Dyer v Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Ltd and Knuckey v Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific 
Ltd,141 and is supported by the fact that the assessment is inherently speculative and is 
not assisted by reference to a claimant’s appearance or inclination.  Consideration of a 
claimant’s re-partnering prospects should therefore instead occur as part of the general 
 
134  Allan v The Commonwealth (1980) 24 SASR 581, 583 (Wells J). 
135  (1997) 17 WAR 85 (Malcolm CJ, Murray and Heenan JJ). 
136  For example, to extend the equitable “presumption of advancement” to the relationship between a 
mother and her adult child – ‘In so far as the presumption … derives from an obligation of support 
… the “egalitarian nature of modern Australian society, including as between the sexes” [Brown v 
Brown (1993) 31 NSWLR 582, 600] demands no less:’ Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 586 
(Toohey J).  See also 601 (McHugh J). 
137  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 363. 
138  Gillies v Hunter Douglas Pty Ltd [1963] QWN 31. 
139  Hollebone v Greenwood [1968] 71 SR(NSW) 424, 430. 
140  See above n 51-4 and accompanying text. 
141  [2003] NSWSC 198 (unreported, Mathews AJ, 27 March 2003) [67-8]; [2003] NSWSC 212 
(unreported, Mathews AJ, 27 March 2003) [58-9] respectively. 
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discount for contingencies. However concerning the second point, Kirby J in De Sales 
noted that the High Court’s decision effectively abolished the remarriage discount 
stating ‘what was formerly the discount for “the prospects of remarriage” does not apply 
… [and] … is therefore no longer part of the law.’142  Consequentially, the Queensland 
Law Reform Commission has subsequently noted that: 
The law as stated in De Sales v Ingrilli … is that the possibility that a surviving 
spouse may form a relationship of financially supportive cohabitation should 
have no effect on the assessment of damages of the surviving spouse.143
 
Notwithstanding this, it would be wrong to interpret the majority judgements as 
meaning that a claimant’s prospects of future financially beneficial re-partnering can 
now never be afforded any weight in all cases involving the assessment of wrongful 
death damages, albeit now as part of the general contingencies discount.  Certainly there 
is no clear statement to this effect by Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ.  Rather 
their Honours state that “ordinarily”:  
1.  No “separate” allowance should be made; and 
2.  The amount of the ‘“standard” adjustment [for vicissitudes] should not be 
increased to re-introduce the “remarriage” discount by the back door.’144   
 
Furthermore if, according to the majority, the possibility of prospective re-partnering is 
now included within the assessment of general contingencies, it would be absurd to 
conclude that it is always to be given no weight.145  Assessment of the contingencies 
discount is a question of fact to be decided on balance.  Therefore, given that there is 
generally a percentage range within which contingencies are assessed, an individual 
claimant’s re-partnering prospects should, all other vicissitudes aside, be properly seen 
as assisting the determination of where in that range the discount should fall.  
 
The High Court majority did not conclusively define the “ordinary case” in relation to a 
claimant’s re-partnering potential – although presumably De Sales was indicative - 
other than by contrast to when the financial advantage or disadvantage associated with 
an actual or intended re-partnering may be separately accounted for.146   Chief Justice 
Gleeson147 similarly defined the term by contrast to where it is possible to predict, with 
some degree of certainty, the likelihood of financially beneficial re-partnering and a 
separate consideration of the discount is warranted – such as: actual or intended re-
partnering; or circumstances (for example religion) suggesting almost no chance of 
remarriage.  His Honour also stated that the possibility of a claimant re-partnering to 
pecuniary advantage should ‘ordinarily be treated as one of the “vicissitudes of life,”’148 
except where separate treatment is required procedurally.  For example as in De Sales 
where the re-partnering discount was only applied to the compensation awarded to one 
of the claimants (Ms De Sales). 
 
 
142  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 396-7. 
143  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Damages in an action for wrongful death, Report No 57 
(2003) 67, n 320.  
144  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 396-7 (Kirby J).  See also 367 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
145  Ibid 356 where this view is supported by Gleeson CJ. 
146  Ibid 365-7, 367-8, 395. 
147  Ibid 354-5. 
148  Ibid 354. 
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Critics of the remarriage discount do not deny its logical relevance to the assessment of 
a wrongful death claimant’s pecuniary loss.149  Their objections instead appear broadly 
directed towards the difficulty of making an accurate appraisal of a widowed spouse’s 
re-partnering prospects, and its distasteful and demeaning nature.  However, 
contingency allowances of this type are not confined to fatal injury cases, being also 
inseparable from an assessment of damages in personal injury claims similarly founded 
upon principles of: compensation; lump sum; once and for all assessment; and a 
balancing of gains and losses.150  The assessment of a claimant’s chance of financially 
beneficial re-partnering is no different in principle from the task facing any judge 
where, in a personal injuries action, one must gaze into the future and assess the 
probable changes in a claimant’s chance of recovery or future earning prospects.  In 
both instances mathematical precision is impossible.   
 
Most modern day fatal accident claims, especially those arising out of road accident or 
work related deaths, involve insured defendants.  The costs of claims are therefore 
borne either by the uninsured defendant personally or the general body of policyholders, 
who participate in or profit from the risk-creating activity, in the form of increased 
premiums.  No doubt any costs borne by defendants arising from their commercial or 
business related activities will be further passed on to the consumer public in the form 
of increased prices for the associated goods and services.  It is preferable that 
wrongdoers and those obtaining the benefit of services or the activity in question pay 
through increased insurance premiums and prices, than society at large - if dependant 
spouses are compensated too little (or not at all) and are thus thrown back on the state 
for support by means of social welfare payments.    Placing responsibility on the 
enterprise liable for the wrongdoing also ensures a greater probability of modification of 
future behaviour.  Nevertheless whilst the claimant’s loss is often prominent at trial, 
fairness is denied if in the assessment of damages the defendant’s position is ignored.151 
Compensatory damages awards are not meant to be punitive, however as Gleeson CJ 
opined in De Sales: 
The consequence of making no allowance for the contingency of remarriage … 
must be to increase … the amount to which the appellant is entitled.  The 
primary argument of the appellant, if correct, means that, by reason of changes 
in the role and status of women, and their increasing independence, a modern 
widow will be taken to have suffered a significantly greater … financial loss in 
consequence of the death of a husband than her counterpart in earlier times.152
 
There is also economic incentive for the provision of fair compensation to ensure that 
risk-creating activities operate at efficient levels and that the affordability of 
insurance153 is not further prejudiced by excessive damages awards.  However, it is only 
through a consideration of a claimant spouse’s re-partnering prospects that this can be 
achieved. 
 
149  Law Reform Committee of South Australia, above n 77, 8. 
150  For example, the deduction of outgoings necessarily incurred in connection with employment from 
the amount awarded on account of economic loss in personal injury actions, on the basis that those 
costs will not be incurred in the future if the plaintiff is no longer working:  Sharman v Evans 
(1977) 138 CLR 563, 577. 
151  Arthur Robinson (Grafton) Pty Ltd v Carter (1968) 122 CLR 649, 657. 
152  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 351-2. 
153  Ibid 406 (Callinan J).  
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Pertaining to the inquiry’s distasteful and demeaning nature, in De Sales Kirby J 
apparently distinguishes cases where topics of a “distasteful nature,” such as the 
formation of future relationships or impairment of sexual function, are evaluated for the 
purpose of “awarding” damages, from those where evaluation is required in order to 
“discount” damages.154  However surely such an investigation would be equally 
intrusive whether made, for example: in a personal injuries action where a claimant 
seeks damages for loss of ability to enjoy personal relationships as part of damages for 
loss of amenities;155 or for the purpose of ascertaining the potential to form future 
relationships in the context of discounting a fatal accident damages award on the basis 
of reduced dependency.  In each case the court must consider intimate details of the 
claimant’s life and weigh possible conflicting argument. Both claimants would surely 
prefer that the incident, which brought them to court, had never happened.  Nevertheless 
both have chosen to bring a claim in respect of their loss.   
 
Indeed many aspects of wrongful death compensation may be demeaning.   In Price v 
Girle156 a remarried plaintiff claimed Lord Campbell’s Act damages for loss of the 
service of his deceased wife, on the basis that his younger second wife was not as good 
a manager and housekeeper as the first, nor as helpful to him in his political career.  The 
claimant had no qualms about advancing this argument for his benefit, although it 
reflected adversely upon his current wife.  The argument was rejected however due to 
lack of evidence of the second wife’s inferior potential.  In Mahoney v Dewinter,157 no 
doubt observations concerning the deceased’s vulnerability to prosecution, fraudulent 
receipt of employment benefits, driver’s licence disqualification and obesity, leading to 
the conclusion that he would not have worked until retirement and had a below average 
life expectancy, were necessary to the court’s compensation assessment, albeit hurtful to 
his memory.  Similarly in Franco v Woolfe in assessing a claimant’s re-partnering 
prospects the Ontario High Court concluded that considering: 
the man and his rather unbending attitudes …  What right-thinking woman 
would take on such a task?  Carl Franco alone would be a challenge to any 
marriage counsellor … Even assuming some woman naïve enough were 
persuaded to marry … I think she would soon give up.158
 
If the critics’ claims were taken to their natural limit, they would provide a basis for 
arguing that the law should revert to its common law position and statutory fatal injury 
claims should be abandoned – however no such claim is made.  Notwithstanding, the 
above analysis does support the argument that whilst a claimant’s re-partnering 
prospects do not deserve to be given separate or substantial weight and affect in 
discounting damages awards, especially of the magnitude afforded in the past, there is 
no ground in principle or policy for singling out this factor for special exclusion from 
the assessment of the vicissitudes which may otherwise impact upon a claimant’s 
damages award.  Courts should not ignore anything likely to affect quantification of 
loss.  Additionally, considering potential re-partnering as part of the discount for 
general contingencies and attributing to the possibility a more modest significance in 
 
154  Ibid 390-1. 
155  Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 584-5, 587-8. 
156  [1966] QWN50. 
157  (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal, McPherson J, 15 March 1993).  
158  (1974) 52 DLR (3d) 355, 360 (Haines J). 
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determining where, in the “standard range”159 normally allowed, the discount should 
fall, is likely to expose a claimant to less intrusive investigation and cross-examination.  
Furthermore if, in a wrongful death claim, a claimant’s prospect of future divorce or 
separation is treated as forming part of the general contingencies that might have 
affected their level of dependency upon the deceased,160 why should not one’s re-
partnering prospects?  Prospective divorce or separation is similarly distasteful and 
uncertain as to occurrence and future financial benefit in terms of maintenance orders 
made pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or the legislation governing de facto 
relationships.161  Therefore, whilst assessing one’s re-partnering prospects may be 
distasteful to both spouse and court, much will depend on the attitude of the individual 
judge, and it is necessary if justice be done. 
 
B  Subsequent Judicial Consideration 
 
Whilst the Queensland Law Reform Commission has confirmed the post-De Sales: 
‘confusion about whether or not the discount [for re-partnering prospects] is to be 
treated as a contingency which does not enlarge the general discount for the vicissitudes 
of life,’162 in Dwight v Bouchier163 the New South Wales Court of Appeal referred to 
the High Court majority.  There it was argued, in a wrongful death claim, that there was 
no basis for reducing an assessment of general contingencies to 10 percent (from the 
standard 15 percent), as the respondent’s remarriage prospects should have been taken 
into account.  However, far from concluding that post-De Sales one’s re-partnering 
prospects are always irrelevant to the assessment, the Court confirmed the trial judge’s 
approach, assessing the prospects as relatively slim and uncertain as to financial benefit 
on the facts.    
 
The Western Australian District Court has also expressed a similar view.  In Hewitt v 
Tonkin, Fenbury DCJ considered it clear from De Sales that no special discount should 
be made for the contingency of remarriage.  Nevertheless, his Honour stated that: 
The plaintiff is a young woman with two children by different fathers.  She may 
or may not form a relationship in the future.  Quite frankly I think that it is likely 
… at some time.  However nobody knows whether it will be beneficial or not 
and how long it will last.  In my view there is no sufficient evidence for the 
Court … to make any special discount for remarriage … beyond the general 
discount for vicissitudes of life. 164
 
Consequentially, it was considered that in these circumstances the appropriate discount 
for contingencies would be the maximum six percent standard discount allowable in 
 
159  See above n 51-4 and accompanying text. 
160  Rodda v Boonjie Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 27 May 1993); 
Goldsworthy v District Council of Port Macdonnell (1992) 57 SASR 473.  This was accepted in 
obiter by the High Court in De Sales, (2002) 212 CLR 338, 349, 355 (Gleeson CJ), 363-4, 366 
(Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 374 (McHugh J). 
161  Currently: Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 19; Property (Relationships) Act 1984 
(NSW), s 27; Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s 36; De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT), s 26; 
Family Court Act 1997 (WA), s 205ZC.  In addition, a de facto spouse’s enforceable rights to 
financial support are more limited: De Sales, (2002) 212 CLR 338, 353, 367, 407. 
162  Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 143, 54. 
163  [2003] NSWCA 3, (unreported, Mason P, Stein and Heydon JJA, 6 February 2003) [64-8]. 
164  [2003] WADC 203 (unreported, Fenbury DCJ, 29 September 2003) [27-8]. 
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that State.  In Mickelberg v Aerodata Holdings whilst no deduction was claimed for any 
prospect of remarriage, the court confirmed that a majority of four to three165 in De 
Sales held that there should be no separate discount on this account.  However O’Brien 
DCJ opined that: ‘such a discount could be taken into account as one of a number of 
general vicissitudes of life,’166 which his Honour then proceeded to assess with 
reference to the respective ages of the deceased and the applicant at the time of death.  
 
Therefore how a claimant’s financially beneficial re-partnering prospects should or may 
be measured, as part of general contingencies, is likely to be the topic of further debate.  
However both Hewitt and Mickelberg suggest that the claimant’s age is likely to be a 
relevant factor.  In 1971 a person widowed at 18 years of age was considered to have a 
54 percent chance of remarrying (and with the inclusion of de facto relationships, 
arguably an even greater chance of re-partnering), whilst one widowed at 55 years had 
only a nine percent likelihood of ultimately remarrying.167  In this light De Sales can be 
seen, not as supporting the contention that post-De Sales a claimant’s prospects of 
financially beneficial re-partnering are irrelevant to the assessment of wrongful death 
damages, but rather inferring that on the facts of that case the balance of possible 
positive and negative factors relevant to an estimation of the claimant’s prospects were 
so multifarious that they operated in the minds of the majority to negate each other.  
Therefore when combined with the other vicissitudes they warranted no change to the 
discount for general contingencies assessed by the Supreme Court168 which was: 
within the standard range and makes appropriate allowance for the various 
contingencies, including the prospect of the appellant’s entering into a 
permanent relationship which is to her financial benefit.169   
For Ms De Sales was aged 36 at the time of trial, and as stated in Cremona v Roads and 
Traffic Authority in connection with the relationship between a claimant’s age and their 
propensity to re-partner - ‘the plaintiff is now 36 and if I may delicately say is neither 
young or old.’170  According to Cruise, a 36-year-old widow has a 51 percent chance of 
ultimately remarrying,171 and is therefore just as likely (practically) not to remarry.  
Indeed, post-De Sales it may be that the claimant’s age is the only individual 
characteristic remaining most relevant to the estimation – given the randomness 
inherent in other facets going towards the formation of future personal relationships.  
Statistics aside, commonsense also prescribes that young widows and widowers are 
more likely to re-partner, albeit with mixed financial benefit.  However holding the 
financial consequence of re-partnering constant (given its multifarious nature), it 
remains that the age of the widowed is useful in determining their propensity to re-
 
165  Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ (Gleeson CJ (“ordinarily” not subject to separate 
consideration), Callinan and McHugh JJ dissenting). 
166  (2003) 31 SR (WA) 351, 354. 
167  KM Cruise, ‘Present Value and Remarriage Rate Tables’ (1971) 45 Australian Law Journal 15, 
160-1.  See also Elford v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 1 Qd R 258. 
168  De Sales v Ingrilli (2000) 23 WAR 417 (FC). 
169  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 369 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
170  Cremona v Road and Traffic Authority [2000] NSWSC 556 (unreported, Dowd J, 20 June 2000) 
[64].  Chief Justice Gleeson (in the minority) also confirmed that there was nothing special about 
Ms De Sales’ age: De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338,355.  
171  Cruise, above n 167, 161.  However see De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, where whilst McHugh J (at 
376-9) and Callinan J (at 405-7) favoured the use of statistics in evaluating a claimant’s re-
partnering potential, at least as a starting point in light of the circumstances of the case, Gleeson CJ 
(at 353), Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ (at 364-5) and Kirby J (at 393-4) were more cautious.  
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partner and consequentially their likelihood of obtaining “some” financial benefit to 
offset their loss.  Support for this notion can be found in the judgements of Gaudron, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in De Sales.172  Justice McHugh (dissenting) also opined that: 
If the support discount were subsumed under the head of general contingencies, 
the percentage … would have to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis … If the 
variation is done properly, it would move in accordance with the age and 
circumstances of the widow or widower.173
 
V REFORM: ACTUAL AND RECOMMENDED 
 
Interpreted with reference to the above argument, the High Court’s approach to the 
remarriage discount in De Sales v Ingrilli is both just and flexible.  On the one hand it 
recognises that, in modern times, applying a separate and substantial discount to a 
wrongful death claimant’s damages assessment on account of their propensity to re-
partner is to erroneously assume that its likelihood of occurrence and continued 
financial benefit can be reasonably predicted – either at all or by reference to the 
claimant’s personality or appearance.  However on the other hand, it acknowledges the 
continued, albeit more limited, importance of one’s propensity in affording a 
consideration of weight when determining, in the circumstances of the case, an 
appropriate discount for general contingencies.  A more just assessment of 
compensation, in line with societal change, thereby ensues which adequately balances 
claimant, defendant and community interests.  Consequently, the decision also 
highlights, as areas in need of further articulation and reform, the significance to be 
afforded to: actual re-partnering in wrongful death actions; and actual or prospective re-
partnering in other actions similarly seeking compensation for loss of support.  
Additionally, the subsumption of the remarriage discount within general vicissitudes 
will require, in light of the disparity in approaches adopted between judgements and 
between jurisdictions, a redefinition or reassessment of the standard contingencies 
discount and a greater need for judicial transparency. 
 
A Weight Attributable to Actual Re-partnering  
 
The assessment of the financial benefit pertaining to a claimant’s actual or intended re-
partnering differs from an assessment of one’s future re-partnering prospects.  As one 
moves along the spectrum from actual towards intended and prospective re-partnering, 
the certainty of the relationship’s formation decreases.  Even an intended re-partnering 
is contingent upon the relationship’s actual formation.  However in all cases, the 
certainty of the relationship’s financial benefit is speculative although perhaps most so 
with prospective future relationships.  Without evidence of the specific relationship 
there is no way of knowing whether it will be of benefit to the claimant.  Even if the 
initial financial benefits of a new relationship were known, it would be wrong to assume 
that they will necessarily continue in their current form or, in the case of an intended re-
partnering, that the benefits will come to fruition. 
 
Therefore, the concerns expressed by the majority in De Sales, in relation to the 
difficulty inherent in predicting the financial benefit pertaining to prospective 
relationships - including an estimation of the future economic features of that 
 
172  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 365. 
173  Ibid 379.  See also 370. 
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relationship, its duration and risks of supervening unemployment, illness or death - also 
apply to the case of actual or intended relationships.174  This was recognised by Gleeson 
CJ175 who opined that such claims may be subject to separate consideration only where 
the evidence is “sufficiently concrete” to allow a special discount to be made.  
Consequentially, the weight traditionally afforded to claims of actual or intended re-
partnering in reducing an assessment of wrongful death damages, may also become the 
subject of greater scrutiny.  In Victoria this has already occurred. 
 
In response to De Sales, Victorian Parliament passed the Wrongs (Remarriage 
Discount) Act 2004, amending section 19 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) to preclude 
courts, when assessing damages, from taking into account as a separate discount both: a 
claimant’s actual remarriage or new domestic partnership; and prospects of remarriage 
or new domestic partnership.  However courts are not prevented from taking into 
account actual or prospective re-partnering as part of the general discount awarded for 
the vicissitudes of life.176  Although expressed to reflect the common law as set out in 
De Sales,177 the legislation extends, in that State, the ambit of the High Court’s decision 
(in obiter) in relation to actual re-partnering.  Rather than being viewed as a separate 
identifiable contingency susceptible to specific calculation, the Act recognises that the 
financial benefit pertaining to actual re-partnering is impossible to accurately predict 
and should therefore be considered together with other general vicissitudes.  Whilst the 
uncertainties inherent in the economic benefit to be derived from actual relationships 
may be thought to be less than that pertaining to intended or prospective relationships, 
this legislation, by reducing the weight traditionally afforded to evidence of actual re-
partnering, represents welcome post-De Sales reform reflective of commonsense.  
 
Conversely, in November 2003, the Queensland Law Reform Commission178 
recommended the introduction of legislation preventing the financial benefits received 
from prospective or intended future relationships from being taken into account “in any 
manner” in wrongful death claims.  With respect, whilst a consideration of actual re-
partnering is not precluded, this seems, unlike the Victorian legislation, an illogical 
compromise – both out of tune with the action’s compensatory function and, it is 
argued, the ratio decidendi of the De Sales decision.  Furthermore, such a result: 
  Provides renewed incentive for defendants, wishing to reduce their liability, to 
actively attempt to obtain evidence of actual re-partnering – resulting in the 
increased private investigation and intrusive cross-examination of claimants; 
  Places a premium on delaying wrongful death claim hearings, with a consequent 
negative impact on the administration of justice; 
  Encourages the delayed social adjustment of the widowed through the provision 
of a disincentive to resume enduring private relationships;  
  In effect, allows a claimant to, tell the court that they have not yet married their 
millionaire because they have been legally advised not to;179 and 
 
174  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 366-7 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 394-5 (Kirby J).  
Affirmed by Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 143, 80. 
175  De Sales (2002) 212 CLR 338, 354. 
176  Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 October 2003, 1294 (Robert Hulls). 
177  Ibid. 
178  Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 143, 55, 80. 
179  Law Reform Committee of South Australia, above n 77, 9. 
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  Is inconsistent with the treatment of a claimant’s prospects of divorce at 
common law, which treatment the Commission supports.180 
 
The Queensland Law Reform Commission’s recommendations have been implemented, 
with retrospective effect, via section 114 of the Justice and Legislation Amendment Act 
2004 (Qld), which inserts sections 23A, 23B, 23C and 23D into the Supreme Court Act 
1995 (Qld). 
B Compensation for Loss of Support 
 
If post-De Sales no (or a reduced) account is to be taken of a surviving partner’s actual 
or prospective re-partnering in spousal wrongful death claims due to the speculative 
nature of the exercise, it is difficult to see why a reconsideration of the weight afforded 
to the formation of relationships should not also occur in relation to other plaintiffs.  For 
example in: 
  Wrongful death actions where a parent successfully claims for loss of an 
unmarried child’s financial support, the possibility of the child marrying is 
traditionally taken into account to reduce the pecuniary value of the parent’s 
dependency;181 
  The case of plaintiffs whose damages for severe personal injury are influenced 
by their likelihood of marriage - here the damages assessment takes into account 
the plaintiff’s loss of an actual or prospective future spouse’s financial support as 
a result of the wrong.  This may occur either as a separate head of damage, or as 
part of the vicissitudes of life leading to a lesser deduction in the assessment of 
lost income,182 and, similarly to wrongful death actions, requires an assessment 
of future dependency; and 
  The assessment of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer183 damages.  Based upon the 
claimant’s need for future domestic assistance, the award has recently184 been 
discounted to reflect the claimant’s prospects of forming a future relationship, 
and the likelihood of that relationship enduring such that services may be 
provided by one’s spouse or partner as part of the normal household sharing of 
tasks, which therefore could not be compensated under this head.185 
 
C Redefinition of Contingencies Discount 
 
In relation to general contingencies, in New South Wales it has been stated that: ‘why 
there should be any conventional discount, and why it should be 15 percent regardless 
 
180  Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 143, 92.  See above n 160 and accompanying text 
for the common law position. 
181  Queensland Law Reform Commission, In Relation to an Examination of the Provisions of the 
Fatal Accidents Acts With a View to Elimination of Anomalies, Report No 9 (1971) 3. 
182  As deductions are not made for time absent whilst child bearing and alike, which may have 
occurred had the plaintiff married.   See Hines v Commonwealth (1995) ATR 81-338; Rosniak v 
Government Insurance Office (1997) 41 NSWLR 608; Commercial Union Assurance Company of 
Australia v Pelosi (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal, Kirby P, 
Handley and Sheller JJA, 2 February 1996). 
183  (1977) 139 CLR 161. 
184  Finch v Rogers [2004] NSWSC 39 (unreported, Kirby J, 13 February 2004) [235-53]. 
185  Domestic services undertaken as part of the ordinary give-and-take of marriage are not services 
necessary to attend to the accident caused needs of a plaintiff, unless the injuries preclude the 
provision of countervailing services: Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327, 343-4 (Deane and 
Dawson JJ). 
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of the infinite variety of chances which may befall an injured person has never 
adequately been debated.’186  Is a person on the New South Wales Clapham Omnibus 
more likely to have a “bad life” than say one in Western Australia?  In De Sales 
McHugh, Callinan and Kirby JJ observed187 that if the remarriage discount was 
incorporated within the vicissitudes of life, the High Court, and/or the legislature, would 
eventually need to consider the disparity in approaches188 adopted by the various state 
courts to the assessment of vicissitudes.  Their Honours also considered that the five 
percent total deduction for contingencies awarded, acceptable in Western Australia, was 
unreasonably low: 
It means that, despite all the assumptions and uncertainties in assessing the loss 
of the chance of dependency over a thirty-four year period, the figure placed on 
the value of the chance … has a 95 per cent confidence level of being correct.189
 
This issue has subsequently arisen for consideration in Western Australia in Hewitt v 
Tonkin190 where, drawing upon the statements made by their Honours in De Sales, the 
defendant argued that the quantum of the general contingencies discount should be 
increased to at least 15 percent (in line with New South Wales) from the standard two to 
six percent.191  However whilst sympathising with the defendant, the District Court held 
itself unable to discount an award by more than six percent without sufficient actuarial 
evidence, which was absent in the materials before it.  However in Misiani v Welshpool 
Engineering Pty Ltd192 it was successfully submitted that post-De Sales the “standard” 
Western Australian discount should not apply when assessing vicissitudes.  Instead the 
Court followed its prior decision in Kschammer v RW Piper & Sons Pty Ltd where 
Malcolm CJ opined that: ‘the appropriate level of discount for contingencies to apply to 
the end figure calculated for future earnings would be not more than 10 percent.’ 193  
Consequentially the Western Australian Supreme Court appears to have now increased 
its standard rate of discount for general contingencies to 10 percent. 
 
Justice Kirby also opined in De Sales that the case did not address whether, or the way 
in which, the discount for financially beneficial re-partnering could be subsumed into 
the discount for general contingencies in those Australian jurisdictions that do not have 
a “standard” discount.194
 
D Judicial Transparency 
 
If prospective financially beneficial re-partnering is included within the discount for 
general contingencies the weight attributed to it on the facts should be made 
apparent.195  This would facilitate: 
  The courts’ appellate function;  
 
186  Moran v McMahon (1985) 3 NSWLR 700, 706 (Kirby P).    
187  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 374, 379-80 (McHugh J), 407-8 (Callinan J), 395-6 (Kirby J). 
188  See above n 51-4 and accompanying text. 
189  De Sales, (2002) 212 CLR 338, 379 (McHugh J). 
190  [2003] WADC 203 (unreported Fenbury DCJ, 29 September 2003). 
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194  (2002) 212 CLR 338, 397-8. 
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  The prevention of impulsive decisions concerning a claimant’s 
“marriageability;”  
  Legal practitioners, both when advising clients and brokering settlements; and 
  The preferred approach to compensation assessment advocated by the High 
Court,196 being the itemisation of each head of damage and the provision of 
reasons for awards made.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
In De Sales v Ingrilli the High Court’s attempt to ensure that the assessment of damages 
in wrongful death actions continues to fully recognise and reflect contemporary social 
realities, is admirable.  The doctrinal assumption of the need to make a separate and 
significant remarriage discount on account of a widow’s re-partnering prospects is 
questionable in a modern society changed from a time when almost any probability of 
re-partnering would be of benefit.  In addition, by rejecting the utility of references to a 
claimant’s appearance and personality, the decision goes some way towards ensuring 
that the indirect discrimination of women is no longer perpetuated through outdated 
determinants of one’s “marriageability” and stereotypical assumptions about marriage 
and financial dependency.  However, whilst abolishing the remarriage discount, it is 
wrong to conclude that the High Court has excluded all consideration of a claimant’s 
marriageability from this form of compensation calculation.  Unless and until affected 
by legislation (such as that now existing in the Northern Territory, Victoria and 
Queensland), the decision does not prevent a separate consideration of a claimant’s 
actual or intended re-partnering, and one’s potential for financially beneficial re-
partnering also remains relevant, albeit now attracting a reduced significance as merely 
assisting in the determination of an appropriate discount for general contingencies.   
 
Therefore what at first glance appears to be a decision that pours water upon the 
consideration of a claimant’s re-partnering prospects, in discounting their wrongful 
death damages award, can instead be perceived as a decision leaving considerable 
uncertainty and requiring further judicial and/or legislative clarification.  In order to 
ensure consistency in the law, the decision arguably requires a reconsideration of the 
treatment given to evidence of re-partnering in the assessment of compensation 
generally, and a revision of the assessment of general contingencies across jurisdictions.   
Another topic of further debate is likely to be how, as part of a court’s assessment of 
general contingencies, a claimant’s prospects of future financially beneficial re-
partnering should or may be measured subsequent to De Sales - although it is argued 
that claimant age should be a relevant consideration.  Consequently it would seem that 
the courts’ work has just begun. 
 
196  Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563, 571-2. 
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